Speeches

I am grateful to the BBC World Service for giving me this opportunity to speak to you on the relationship between Europe and America.

The World Service has made an outstanding contribution to better international understanding and to the cause of friendship across national boundaries. I was delighted to read - in its latest newsletter - of its progress in setting up an FM service in Kosovo and also the development of its interactive service to China. Despite all the difficulties which have been put in its way there is no doubt that World Service reports are highly valued by a significant number of well educated and potentially very influential Chinese.

I certainly wish the World Service every success in its endeavours - in China and the rest of the world.

My theme this evening relates to one particular aspect of international relations - indeed one particular relationship. But it is a relationship which matters and matters hugely - for those directly involved and for the world as a whole.

The relationship in question is that between Europe and North America. Note Europe - not just Britain - and North America - not just the USA. At present that relationship is one of partnership. The question is whether that will continue or whether the partnership will degenerate into rivalry.

It is not a question for the immediate future - not something which will be decided next week, next month or even next year. It is a question for the medium term.

But I believe that over that medium term there are trends at work - on both sides of the Atlantic - which are undermining the partnership and fomenting the rivalry. I also believe that the Atlantic Partnership which currently exists is of immense value - not only to Europe and North America but to the world at large.

The world is facing - and will continue to face - a number of challenges which can most effectively be met and overcome by Europe and North America in partnership with each other. If, on the other hand, these challenges are to become the cockpit of rivalry between Europe and America, opportunities for one to seek advantage at the expense of the other, the world is likely to become a less peaceful, a less stable and a less prosperous place. All its inhabitants will suffer from the fallout.

This may seem a pessimistic analysis leading to an apocalyptic conclusion. I hope it is. But let me explain why it may not be and what action might be taken to improve things.

First of all the trends. What are these underlying forces that are beginning to drive America and Europe apart?

Let's start with North America. One of the most noticeable developments which those us who cross the Atlantic fairly frequently have observed is the extent to which North America is increasingly preoccupied with the Pacific and what lies beyond it.

The centre of gravity within North America has increasingly been shifting westwards. California long ago overtook New York as the most populous state in the US. British Columbia is playing an increasingly important role in Canada. Many of the most significant developments in both countries take place on the West Coast. Silicon Valley and Microsoft are both there.

And beyond that coast, across the Pacific Ocean, lie lands which matter more and more to North Americans. Japan, despite its recent difficulties, remains an economic giant. China, is, for the United States, both its greatest opportunity as a market place of enormous potential and its greatest threat as a potential superpower in the first half of the new century.

Hence, for example, the enormous coverage understandably given to the recent Chinese spy case - an event covered much more scantily in the European media.

China is not quite yet an American obsession. But it could very easily become one.

The increasing preoccupation with other parts of the globe is reinforced by demographic trends in North America. There are growing numbers of citizens of Asiatic descent in both Canada and the United States. And the increasing Hispanic population, particularly in the United States, tend to look south to Mexico and the rest of Latin America beyond, rather than east to Europe.

The increasing use of Spanish in schools in the United States tends to reinforce this trend. You do not have to believe the story of the very proper Bostonian lady who when asked how she was proposing to travel to California replied, "by way of Dedham" to see that many of the old personal links which connected Europe and North America are dissolving.

The policy area where disputes between the two partners have got closest to fracturing transatlantic relationships is trade. Here attempts by the US to exert extra territorial jurisdiction including the attempt to ban British businessmen from visiting Castro's Cuba have undoubtedly led to quite deep seated European resentment. And European attitudes to the import of bananas from the Caribbean and hormone treated beef have no doubt aroused strong reactions in North America.

The trading relationship is likely to be the most difficult of all to manage. Here there are legitimate rivalries.

Commercial interests do differ. Governments are increasingly called on to assist their own companies. Conflicts are inevitable.

Perhaps the most effective antidote to these stresses and strains is the growth of transatlantic multi-national concerns. In this way the most persistent ogre in left-wing demonology could yet inhibit and mitigate the kind of inter-government rivalry which has the potential to do so much harm.

Even so diplomatic skills of a very high order are likely to be needed if these conflicts are to be effectively managed.

I have so far concentrated on the threats to the Atlantic partnership that emanate from North America. This does not mean that the trends which I fear are only evident on the western shores of the Atlantic Ocean. Far from it. Developments in Europe are at least as ominous.

Indeed if there is one single factor which contains the seeds of rivalry to a greater extent than any other it is the drive towards European integration. This is in part, explicitly motivated by a desire to create in Europe a rival centre of power to the United States. I say, in part. I recognise that by no means all those who espouse the objective of a single European State are anti-American. But it cannot be denied that a number of them are.

In France, during the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty one of the posters used by the campaigners for a 'Yes' vote featured a Yankee cowboy squashing the globe beneath his boots. The accompanying slogan read: "Faire l'Europe cest faire le poids" (To build Europe is to give us weight).

President Mitterand put it more vividly.

"France does not know it", he said, "but we are at war with America. Yes a permanent war, a vital war, a war without death. Yes, they are very hard, the Americans, they are voracious, they want undivided power over the world."

And many of the most ardent advocates of the single currency wish to see it rival the dollar as an international reserve currency. It is not inevitable that a single European State would be a rival rather than a partner of North America. But the odds on that outcome would be sharply increased.

Let us look, for example, at some of the manifestations of the drive towards European integration which are with us now.

The Treaty of Amsterdam strengthens the development of a European foreign and security policy.

Now it seems to me that within properly defined limits, and provided that decisions are taken by consensus, there is a clear case for the development of a common foreign policy for the European Union. Its member states clearly have many interests in common. It makes sense for those common interests to be safeguarded and addressed by co-operative and co-ordinated actions.

But, inevitably, as the potential for action of this kind increases so the potential for conflict with North America, especially the United States, increases. Differences already exist. European countries have different policies from the United States, on Cuba, Israel, Iraq and Libya to name just a very few.

On the whole these differences have, so far, been managed reasonably successfully without impairing the fundamental harmony of the alliance.

But it is not at all difficult to foresee situations in which the differences might become much more acute. The limits of diplomatic management could be tested to breaking point. I have already referred to the growing preoccupation of America with China both as trading opportunity and military threat.

What if the European Union, sensing some trading advantage were to take a fundamentally different view to the United States on the desirability of transferring advanced technology to China?
How long would it be before relations with China became a cockpit of transatlantic rivalry?

We have, after all, already seen a difference emerge between the readiness of the United States to condemn China's human rights record at the UN Commission for Human Rights and the refusal of the member states of the European Union to do so. These are by no means fanciful, hypothetical situations. They are real and some of them are with us now.

Most sensitive of all is the future of the military relationship between Europe and North America. For the last 50 years this has been the keystone of the partnership despite complexities caused by the fact that not all the European members of NATO are members of the European Union and not all the members of the European Union are members of NATO. The Western European Union, which includes all relevant countries provided the organisational structure for preserving and promoting partnership.

Now, as a result of an initiative by the UK Government, the future of the Western European Union is uncertain.

The UK Government has signed an agreement with France at St Malo which expressly provides for military co-operation between the two countries "inside and outside" the framework of NATO.

It is not difficult to see how European military co-operation outside the framework of NATO could have the most profound and far-reaching implications for the whole of the Atlantic partnership.

The part played by the UK Government in promoting this initiative calls into question the extent to which Britain would continue to perform its traditional bridge building role.

This is not to deny the potential of that role which is clearly very important. It is, moreover, a role that Britain would no longer be able to play if it left the EU as is sometimes advocated. But even within the EU Britain's role cannot be taken for granted as the St Malo agreement shows.

These then are some of the trends which, if left unchecked, could pull Europe and North America apart.

But surely, some may object, they are not all new. Have not warnings of this kind been given periodically over the last quarter of a century and haven't they all come to naught?

Well yes it is true that some of these trends have been visible for a while. And yes, warnings have been given in the past and have proved misplaced.

But I would suggest there is one enormous difference. The Cold War is well and truly over.

The Cold War was the glue which held both shores of the Atlantic together. Whatever strains and stresses were present during these years, they paled into insignificance compared to the threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites. The price of putting the ability to meet that threat at risk was simply too high to contemplate.

But the glue has now dissolved. The threat us no longer there. And so, many think, the risks can be taken with impunity.

I believe this to be a profoundly mistaken and superficial attitude even though it is undoubtedly widespread on the continent of Europe and has some adherents in this country.

If partnership is replaced by rivalry and rivalry becomes hostility both Europe and America will be the losers. Some may say, indeed do say, that Europe could never rival North America - that any attempt to do so would be doomed to failure. I am inclined to agree. But the very effort of attempting such rivalry would do tremendous damage to the partnership.

And it would not only be Europe and North America who would suffer.

Many of the problems faced by the post Cold War world can best be overcome by Europe and America acting together.
Kosovo is the most recent example of this. Even in far away East Timor there is British and American support for the main Australian contingent.

If instead of working together to meet these challenges Europe and North America seek to exploit them for their own purposes and make them a focus of their own rivalries and hostility, the rest of the world would indeed be gravely disadvantaged. There are many "what if" questions that might arise.

What if Taiwan and China were, ultimately, to face up to each other? Would Europe and America necessarily be on the same side?

What if Europe and America find each other sharply at odds over some future conflict in the Balkans? What if they find themselves backing different, opposing combatants?

It is in everyone's interest - European, American, Asian and African - that this should not happen, that this partnership should be preserved. How is this to be done? Indeed can it be done?

I believe the answer is yes. Yes it can be but it is going to require a tremendous amount of work.
What is needed is a great effort to ensure that the policy makers and decision takers - on both sides of the Atlantic - are alert to the dangers and always take them into account. Very often of course the transatlantic dimensions - the need to promote the partnership - will not, cannot, be the decisive factor in making policy or taking the decisions. But if it is not overlooked, if those in positions of responsibility are resolved to do all they can to minimise the strains and mitigate the damage the danger can, in my view, be averted.

The task that faces those of us who care about this issue is to create the right kind of political and intellectual hinterland - the right backdrop - for the policy makers.
If we are prepared to think, talk and write on this issue, on a sustained basis, we ourselves can influence the outcome.

It is a huge task and a great responsibility. I hope some of you who are here this evening will work with me to help preserve the Atlantic Partnership that has been so successful for the last 50 years. It will be needed just as much in the next 50. I hope and pray it will be there, unimpaired and intact, to help make our planet a safer and happier place on which to live.

Rt Hon
Michael Howard QC MP